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Abstract 
It has recently been argued that a Naive Bayesian classifier can be used to filter unsolicited bulk e-mail 
(“spam”). We conduct a thorough evaluation of this proposal on a corpus that we make publicly 
available, contributing towards standard benchmarks. At the same time we investigate the effect of 
attribute-set size, training-corpus size, lemmatization, and stop-lists on the filter’s performance, issues 
that had not been previously explored. After introducing appropriate cost-sensitive evaluation measures, 
we reach the conclusion that additional safety nets are needed for the Naive Bayesian anti-spam filter to 
be viable in practice. 
1 Introduction 
Unsolicited bulk e-mail, electronic messages posted blindly to thousands of recipients, is becoming 
alarmingly common. Although most users find these postings – called “spam” – annoying and delete 
them immediately, the low cost of e-mail is a strong incitement for direct marketers advertising anything 
from vacations to get-rich schemes. A 1997 study (Cranor & LaMacchia, 1998) found that 10% of the 
incoming e-mail to a corporate network was spam. Apart from wasting time, spam costs money to users 
with dial-up connections, wastes bandwidth, and may expose under-aged recipients to unsuitable (e.g. 
pornographic) content.  
Some anti-spam filters are already available.
1
 These rely mostly on manually constructed pattern-
matching rules that need to be tuned to each user’s incoming messages, a task requiring time and 
expertise. Furthermore, the characteristics of spam (e.g. products advertised, frequent terms) change 
over time, requiring the rules to be maintained. A system that would learn automatically to separate 
spam from other “legitimate” messages would, therefore, present significant advantages.  
Several machine learning algorithms have been applied to text categorization (e.g. Apte & Damerau,  
1994; Lewis, 1996; Dagan et al., 1997; see Sebastiani, 1999, for a survey). These algorithms learn to 
classify documents into fixed categories, based on their content, after being trained on manually 
categorized documents. Algorithms of this kind have also been used to thread e-mail (Lewis & 
Knowles, 1997), classify e-mail into folders (Cohen, 1996; Payne & Edwards, 1997), identify 
interesting news articles  (Lang, 1995), etc. To the best of our knowledge, however, only one attempt 
has ever been made to apply a machine learning algorithm to anti-spam filtering (Sahami et al., 1998).  
Sahami et al. trained a Naive Bayesian classifier (Duda & Hart, 1973; Mitchell 1997) on manually 
categorized legitimate and spam messages, reporting impressive precision and recall on unseen 
messages. It may be surprising that text categorization can be effective in anti-spam filtering: unlike 
other text categorization tasks, it is the act of blindly mass-mailing a message that makes it spam, not its 
actual content. Nevertheless, it seems that the language of spam constitutes a distinctive genre, and that 
spam messages are often about topics rarely mentioned in legitimate messages, making it possible to 
train a text classifier for anti-spam filtering.  
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 See, for example, http://www.tucows.com. Consult http://www.cauce.org, http://www.junkemail.org, 
and http://spam.abuse.net for related resources and legal issues.  
Text categorization research has benefited from publicly available manually categorized document 
collections, like the Reuters corpus (Lewis, 1992), that have been used as benchmarks. Creating similar 
resources for anti-spam filtering is not straightforward, because a user’s incoming e-mail stream cannot 
be made public without violating his/her privacy. A useful approximation of such a stream, however, 
can be made by mixing spam messages with messages extracted from spam-free public archives of 
mailing lists. Towards that direction, we test Sahami et al.’s approach on a mixture of spam messages 
and messages sent via the Linguist list,
2
 a moderated (hence, spam-free) list about the profession and 
science of linguistics. The resulting corpus, dubbed Ling-Spam, is made publicly available for others to 
use as a benchmark.
3
  
The Linguist messages are, of course, more topic-specific than most users’ incoming e-mail. They are 
less standardized, however, than one might expect (e.g. they contain job postings, software availability 
announcements, even flame-like responses), to the extent that useful preliminary conclusions about anti-
spam filtering of a user’s incoming e-mail can be reached with Ling-Spam, at least until better public 
corpora become available. With a more direct interpretation, our experiments can be seen as a study on 
anti-spam filters for open unmoderated mailing lists or newsgroups. 
Unlike Sahami et al., we use ten-fold cross-validation which makes our results less prone to random 
variation. Our experiments also shed more light on the behavior of Naive Bayesian anti-spam filtering 
by investigating the effect of attribute-set size, training-corpus size, lemmatization, and stop-lists, issues 
not covered by Sahami et al.’s study. Furthermore, we show how evaluation measures that incorporate a 
decision-theoretic notion of cost can be employed. Our results confirm Sahami et al.’s high precision 
and recall. A cost-sensitive evaluation, however, suggests that complementary safety nets are needed for 
the Naive Bayesian filter to be viable.  
Section 2 discusses Naive Bayesian classification; section 3 lists Sahami et al.’s results; section 4 
describes our filtering system, the Ling-Spam corpus, and our results; section 5 introduces cost-sensitive 
evaluation measures; and section 6 concludes.  
2 Naive Bayesian classification 
Each message is represented by a vector nxxxxx ,,,, 321 = , where nxx ,,1   are the values of 
attributes nXX ,,1  . Following Sahami et al., we use binary attributes: 1=iX  if some characteristic 
represented by iX  is present in the message; otherwise 0=iX . In our experiments, attributes 
correspond to words, i.e. each attribute shows if a particular word (e.g. “adult”) is present. To select 
among all possible attributes, we follow Sahami et al. and compute the mutual information (MI ) of 
each candidate attribute X  with the category-denoting variable C : 
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The attributes with the highest MI s are selected. Probabilities are estimated as frequency ratios from 
the training corpus (see Mitchell, 1996, for better estimators that we plan to incorporate in future).  
From Bayes’ theorem and the theorem of total probability, given the vector nxxx ,,1 l=  of a 
document d , the probability that d  belongs to category c  is: 
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The probabilities )|( CXP  are practically impossible to estimate directly (the possible values of X  are 
too many, and there are data-sparseness problems). The Naive Bayesian classifier makes the simplifying 
assumption that nXX ,,1 l  are conditionally independent given the category C . Then: 
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 Archived at http://listserv.linguistlist.org/archives/linguist.html. 
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 The Ling-Spam corpus is available from http://www.iit.demokritos.gr/~ionandr/publications.htm. 
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where )|( CXP i  and )(CP  can be easily estimated as relative frequencies from the training corpus. 
Several studies have found the Naive Bayesian classifier to be surprisingly effective (Langley et al.,  
1992; Domingos & Pazzani, 1996), despite the fact that its independence assumption is usually over-
simplistic.  
Mistakenly blocking a legitimate message (classifying it as spam) is generally more severe than letting a 
spam message pass the filter (classifying a spam message as legitimate). Let SL→  and LS→  denote 
the two error types.  Assuming that SL→  is λ  times more costly than LS→ , we classify a message 
as spam if: 
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To the extent that the independence assumption holds and the probability estimates are accurate, a 
classifier adopting this criterion achieves optimal results (Duda & Hart, 1973). In our case, 
)|(1)|( xXlegitimateCPxXspamCP ==−=== , which leads to an alternative reformulation of the 
criterion: 
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λ
λ
+
=
1
t , 
t
t
−
=
1
λ  
Sahami et al. set the threshold t  to 0.999 ( 999=λ ); i.e. blocking a legitimate message is as bad as 
letting 999 spam messages pass the filter. Such a high value of λ  is reasonable when blocked messages 
are discarded without further processing, as most users would consider losing a legitimate message 
unacceptable. Alternative configurations are possible, however, where lower values of λ  are 
reasonable. Instead of deleting a blocked message, it could be returned to the sender, with a request to 
re-send it to a private un-filtered e-mail address of the recipient (see also Hall, 1998). The private 
address would never be advertised (e.g. on web pages), making it unlikely to receive spam directly; and 
the request to re-send could include a frequently changing riddle (e.g. “Include in the subject the capital 
of France.”) to ensure that replies are not sent by spam-generating robots. In that case, 9=λ  ( 9.0=t ) 
seems reasonable: blocking a legitimate message is penalized mildly more than letting a spam message 
pass, to model the fact that re-sending a blocked message involves more work (by the sender) than 
manually deleting a spam message. Even 1=λ  ( 5.0=t ) may be acceptable, if the recipient does not 
care about extra work imposed on the sender.  
3 Previous results 
Table 1 summarizes Sahami et al.’s results. If SLn →  and LSn →  are the numbers of SL→  and LS→  
errors, and LLn → , SSn →  are the numbers of correctly treated legitimate and spam messages, then spam 
recall ( SR ) and spam precision ( SP ) are:  
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In the second experiment of table 1, candidate attributes included not only word-attributes, but also 
attributes showing if particular hand-picked phrases (e.g. “be over 21”) were present. In the third and 
fourth experiments, non-textual candidate attributes were added, showing if messages had manually 
chosen properties (e.g. attachments). Sahami et al.’s phrasal and non-textual attributes introduce a 
manual configuration stage, as one has to select manually phrases and non-textual characteristics to be 
treated as candidate attributes. Since our target was to explore fully automatic anti-spam filtering, we 
have limited ourselves to word-attributes.  
4 Experiments with Ling-Spam  
Our experiments were all performed on the Ling-Spam corpus, which consists of: 
• 2412 Linguist messages, obtained by randomly downloading digests from the archives, 
separating their messages, and removing text added by the list’s server.  
• 481 spam messages, received by the first author. Attachments, HTML tags, and duplicate spam 
messages received on the same day were not included.  
Spam is 16.6% of the corpus, a figure close to the spam rates of the authors, Sahami et al.’s fourth 
experiment, and rates reported elsewhere (Cranor & LaMacchia, 1998).  
Our implementation of the Naive Bayesian filter (developed on GATE), includes a lemmatizer that 
converts each word to its base form, and a stop-list that removes from messages the 100 most frequent 
words of the British National Corpus (BNC).
4
 The two modules can be enabled or disabled, allowing 
their effect to be measured.  
To reduce random variation, ten-fold cross-validation was employed, and averaged scores are reported. 
In a first series of experiments, the number of retained attributes (highest MI ) ranged from 50 to 700 
by 50, for all combinations of enabled/disabled lemmatizer and stop-list. Three thresholds were tried: 
999.0=t  ( 999=λ ), 9.0=t  ( 9=λ ), and 5.0=t  ( 1=λ ). As discussed in section 2, these represent 
three scenarios: deleting blocked messages; issuing a re-send request and accounting for the sender’s 
extra work; and issuing a re-send request ignoring the sender’s extra work.  
Figures 1 – 3 show that the filter achieved impressive spam recall and precision at all three thresholds, 
verifying in that sense the findings of Sahami et al. In all cases, lemmatization seems to improve results. 
The stop-list has a positive effect for 1=λ  and 9=λ , but its effect looks negligible for 999=λ . 
Without a single evaluation measure, however, to be used instead of spam precision and recall, it is 
difficult to check if the effects of the lemmatizer and the stop-list are statistically significant.  
For 999=λ , blocking a legitimate message is much more severe than letting a spam message pass the 
filter. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that the “best” configuration is the one that maximizes 
spam precision. This is achieved with 300 attributes and the lemmatizer enabled (100% spam precision, 
63% spam recall; here, the effect of the stop-list is negligible). For 1=λ  and 9=λ , however, it is hard 
to tell which configuration (combination of precision and recall) is best. Again, a single measure is 
needed; and it must be sensitive to our cost. We discuss this next.
5
 
                                                          
4
 GATE, including the lemmatizer, is available from http://www.dcs.shef.ac.uk/research/groups/nlp. 
BNC frequency lists are available from ftp://ftp.itri.bton.ac.uk/pub/bnc. 
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 The F-measure, used in information retrieval and extraction to combine recall and precision, is 
unsuitable to our purposes, because its weighting factor cannot be easily related to our notion of cost. 
Attributes Total 
Messages 
Testing 
Messages 
% Spam Spam 
Precision 
Spam 
Recall 
words only 1789 251 88.2%  97.1% 94.3% 
words + phrases 1789 251 88.2%  97.6% 94.3% 
words + phrases + non-textual 1789 251 88.2% 100.0% 98.3% 
words + phrases + non-textual 2815 222 ~20%  92.3% 80.0% 
 
Table 1: Resuls of Sahami et al. (500 attributes, threshold = 0.999, 999=λ ) 
5 Cost-sensitive evaluation measures 
In classification tasks, two commonly used evaluation measures are accuracy ( Acc ) and error rate 
( AccErr −=1 ). In our case: 
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LN  and SN  are the numbers of legitimate and spam messages to be classified. 
Accuracy and error rate assign equal weights to the two error types ( SL→  and LS→ ). When 
selecting the threshold of the classifier (section 2), however, we assumed that SL→  is λ  times more 
costly than LS→ . To make accuracy and error rate sensitive to this cost, we treat each legitimate 
message as if it were λ  messages: when a legitimate message is misclassified, this counts as λ  errors; 
and when it is classified correctly, this counts as λ  successes. This leads to weighted accuracy (WAcc ) 
and weighted error rate ( WAccWErr −=1 ): 
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Figure 1: Spam precision and recall at 
5.0=t  ( 1=λ ) 
Figure 2: Spam precision and recall at 
9.0=t ( 9=λ ) 
Figure 3: Spam precision and recall at 999.0=t  ( 999=λ ) 
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When using accuracy or error rate (weighted or not), it is important to compare to a simplistic 
“baseline” approach, to avoid misinterpreting the often high accuracy and low error rate scores. As 
baseline, we use the case where no filter is present: legitimate messages are (correctly) never blocked, 
and spam messages (mistakenly) always pass the filter. The weighted accuracy and error rate of the 
baseline are: 
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To compare easily with the baseline, we introduce the total cost ratio (TCR ): 
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Greater TCR  indicates better performance. For 1<TCR , not using the filter is better. If cost is 
proportional to wasted time, TCR  measures how much time is wasted to delete manually all spam 
messages when no filter is present ( SN ), compared to the time wasted to delete manually any spam 
messages that passed the filter ( LSn → ) plus the time needed to recover from mistakenly blocked 
legitimate messages ( SLn →⋅λ ).  
Table 2 lists spam recall, spam precision, weighted accuracy, baseline weighted accuracy, and TCR , 
for various configurations of the filter, and for the number of attributes that led to the highest TCR  with 
each configuration. Figures 4 – 6 show TCR  for different numbers of attributes, and 1=λ , 9, 999. In 
all cases, ten-fold cross validation was used, and average WAcc  is reported. TCR  is computed as 
bWErr  divided by the average WErr . Increasing the number of attributes beyond a certain point 
generally degrades performance, because attributes with low MI  do not discriminate well between the 
two categories.   
At all three λ  values, the highest TCR  scores were obtained with the lemmatizer enabled. The stop-list 
had an additional positive effect for 1=λ  and 9=λ , but not for 999=λ . The differences, however, 
are not always statistically significant. For 1=λ , paired single-tailed t-tests on WAcc between all filter 
configurations of table 2 confirm only that configurations (b) and (d) are better than (a) at 05.0<p . All 
four configurations, however, are significantly better than the baseline at 01.0<p . For 9=λ , none of 
Table 2: Results on Ling-Spam for best no. of attributes (2893 total messages, 16.6% spam, 10-fold 
cross validation, attributes ranging from 50 to 700 by a step of 50) 
Filter Configuration λ  No. of 
attrib. 
Spam 
Recall 
Spam 
Precision 
Weighted 
Accuracy 
Baseline 
W. Acc. 
TCR 
(a) bare 1  50 81.10%  96.85% 96.408% 83.374% 4.63 
(b) stop-list 1  50 82.35%  97.13% 96.649% 83.374% 4.96 
(c) lemmatizer 1 100 82.35%  99.02% 96.926% 83.374% 5.41 
(d) lemmatizer + stop-list 1 100 82.78%  99.49% 97.064% 83.374% 5.66 
(a) bare 9 200 76.94%  99.46% 99.419% 97.832% 3.73 
(b) stop-list 9 200 76.11%  99.47% 99.401% 97.832% 3.62 
(c) lemmatizer 9 100 77.57%  99.45% 99.432% 97.832% 3.82 
(d) lemmatizer + stop-list 9 100 78.41%  99.47% 99.450% 97.832% 3.94 
(a) bare 999 200 73.82%  99.43% 99.912% 99.980% 0.23 
(b) stop-list 999 200 73.40%  99.43% 99.912% 99.980% 0.23 
(c) lemmatizer 999 300 63.67% 100.00% 99.993% 99.980% 2.86 
(d) lemmatizer + stop-list 999 300 63.05% 100.00% 99.993% 99.980% 2.86 
 
the hypotheses of table 2, e.g. that configuration (d) is better than (a), are statistically significant at 
05.0<p , but all configurations are, again, significantly better than the baseline at 01.0<p . For 
999=λ , the filter achieves 1>TCR  only with the lemmatizer enabled. The stop-list has essentially no 
effect, and both configurations (c) and (d) are significantly better than the baseline at 01.0<p .  
Overall, for 1=λ  and 9=λ  the filter demonstrates a stable behavior, with TCR  constantly greater 
than 1. For 999=λ , however, the filter achieves 1>TCR  only for one particular number of attributes 
(300), because the SL→  error is penalized so heavily that a single blocked legitimate message is 
enough for bWAcc  to exceed WAcc  (the filter makes no such error at 300 attributes). In a real 
application, it is unlikely that one would be able to pin-point precisely the optimal number of attributes, 
which casts doubts over the applicability of the filter for 999=λ . 
Even more worrying, for 999=λ , are the results of a second series of experiments we performed, this 
time varying the size of the training corpus. At every ten-fold repetition, Ling-Spam was divided into 
ten parts, with one part reserved for testing. From each one of the remaining nine parts, only x% was 
used for training, with x  ranging from 10 to 100 by 10. Figure 7 shows the resulting TCR  scores for 
=λ 1, 0.9, 0.999. All experiments were conducted with the lemmatizer and stop-list enabled, and with 
the best numbers of attributes, as in table 2. 
 
Figure 4: TCR  at 5.0=t  ( 1=λ ) Figure 5: TCR at 9.0=t ( 9=λ ) 
Figure 6: TCR  at 999.0=t  ( 999=λ ) Figure 7: TCR  for variable training corpus 
size, with lemmatizer and stop-list 
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Unlike 1=λ  and 9=λ , for 999=λ  the filter reached 1>TCR  only with 100% of the training corpus, 
and one cannot easily assume that TCR  would remain 1>  given more training. (We attribute the initial 
peak of TCR  to the fact that with very little training the classifier tends to classify all messages into the 
most frequent category, legitimate, which protects it from making a costly SL→  error). These 
findings suggest that when 999=λ , the filter is not safe enough to use.  
6 Conclusions 
Our cost-sensitive evaluation suggests that, despite its high spam recall and precision, the Naive 
Bayesian filter is not viable when blocked messages are deleted (a situation we modelled with 
999=λ ). With additional safety nets, however, like re-sending to private addresses, the cost of 
blocking a legitimate message is lower (we used 1=λ  and )9=λ , and the filter has a stable significant 
positive contribution.  
We plan to implement anti-spam filters based on alternative machine learning algorithms, and compare 
them to the Naive Bayesian filter. We expect automatic anti-spam filtering to become an important 
member of an emerging family of junk-filtering tools for the Internet, which will include tools to 
remove advertisements (Kushmerick, 1999), and block hostile or pornographic material (Forsyth, 1996; 
Spertus, 1997). 
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